little urban development: in 1979 the town of Roi-et had a population of 30,209 engaged in administration, commerce, and services rather than manufacturing. Unlike some other Northeastern towns—Korat, Khon Kaen, Udornthani, and Ubonratchathani (see Map 1)—Roi-et has never been designated a growth pole. District towns within the province have 2,000–5,000 people each, and are distinguished from surrounding villages only by a district office, one or two repair shops, a few general stores and restaurants, and a small morning market for fresh produce. Ranked by gross provincial product, Roi-et is the second poorest of Thailand's 72 provinces. It had higher net and gross rates of migration to Bangkok during 1965–70 than any other Northeastern province, as shown in Table 1. Rates of out-movement have probably increased since.

Little more would need be said if one were seeking a macrolevel understanding of movement out of Roi-et. But questions remain that are central to any attempt at assessing the effects of rural-to-urban movement, and at controlling or managing the process. It is in an effort to answer these questions that our analysis of movement focuses on interpersonal networks.

DATA

This analysis of movement at the "rural end" is based on field work conducted in 1979 in six villages in Atsamat District, Roi-et. Aside from many semi-structured conversations that provided the basis for qualitative observations, formal interviews in 356 households constituted the principal source of data. Household registration cards, corroborated and amended by village headmen, provided the sampling frame. We used random sampling procedures, with the proviso that households would be included only if they contained at least one male or one never married female between the ages of 15 and 39 who was presently living in the household. In each household separate interviews were conducted with the household head and a member of the household between ages 15 and 39, either a male or a never married female. The sample included about 50 percent of the households in each of the six villages.

All the demographic and movement data from the Roi-et survey are from a representative of each sampled household, normally the head or the spouse of the head of the household. Respondents were asked to provide information for all persons over the age of 10 whom they

MAP 1 Northeastern Thailand and Roi-et Province



considered to be members of their households. Regarding out-movement, household heads were asked which members had been absent for one night or longer during each of four agricultural seasons per year over a three-year reference period, from the "before-harvest" season of 1976 to the "planting" season of 1979, or a total of 12 seasons. For the one year (four seasons) prior to the interview, heads were also asked what proportion of each season had household members spent in the village and what proportion had they spent in the

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TABLE 1 Five-year migration from Northeastern provinces to Bangkok: 1965–70

Province	Population, ages 5+	Migrants to Bangkok	Migrants from Bangkok	Rate of migration from Bangkok	Rate of migration to Bangkok	Net rate of migration to Bangkok
Kalasin	459,121	1,878	505	0.1	0.4	0.3
Khon Kaen	853,103	4,864	2,826	0.3	0.6	0.2
Chaiyaphum	155,398	2,441	608	0.1	0.5	0.4
Nakhon Phanom	461,843	1,139	925	0.2	0.2	0.0
Nakhon Ratchasima	1,223,930	13,143	6,500	0.5	1.1	0.5
Buriram	644,215	3,156	837	0.1	0.5	0.4
Mahasarakham	446,625	3,194	616	0.1	0.7	0.6
ROI-ET	638,053	9,976	1,011	0.2	1.6	1.4
Loei	267,127	487	494	0.2	0.2	0.0
Sisaket	646,461	4,907	734	0.1	0.8	0.6
Sakon Nakhon	484,317	1,212	686	0.1	0.3	0.1
Surin	620,605	4,734	753	0.1	0.8	0.6
Nongkhai	359,759	838	724	0.2	0.2	0.0
Udonthani	893,866	2,626	3,457	0.4	0.3	0.1
Ubon Ratchathani	1,204,028	12,218	2,916	0.2	1.0	0.8

SOURCE: 1970 Census volumes for Phra Nakhon and Thonburi provinces.

place of destination. These questions were designed to capture the full range of movement from the brief visits to town by villagers and the equally brief returns home by people now living most of the time in town, to the once-only move to town that might become a permanent change of residence. By using household heads as informants, we could gather data both for people in the village and those away at the time of the survey. A related survey was used to collect information from individuals concerning their moving experiences. The reference to agricultural seasons was intended both to aid the memories of the informants and to facilitate analysis of the temporal patterns of movement in relation to the variations in demand for farm labor.

One of the measurement problems associated with this procedure is the demand it makes on the memories of the informants. This problem was minimized by careful interviewing, with cross-checks wherever possible between responses to different questions, and with references to specific events to jog respondents' memories. Other problems are partly of measurement and partly conceptual. Given the fluid, continuous process of movement in and out of the study villages, household membership is difficult to define adequately. How should someone be classified who has been living in town for several years, but makes occasional village visits to bring money or help with the harvest? Is he still a household member and are his moves therefore to be included in the analysis, or not? In his movements he may behave in precisely the same way whether he is married or single; should marriage therefore affect the category into which he is placed? What of the man who spends half his time in the village and half in town, and has a house, work, and family in each location? These are some of the conceptual problems, whose resolution affects the way in which rates of movement are calculated, as do differences among household heads in their criteria for deciding who is a household member and who is not. The complexities of the household's role in migration decisions are discussed later. For the time being it can be said that we deemed people to have left the household if they were absent for an extended period, did not contribute to the household economically, and, most importantly, if they had married. Absence and noncontribution, or absence and marriage, would usually be enough for a former member not to be counted as a member at the time of the survey, but no one of these characteristics would normally be sufficient by itself for exclusion.

The six study villages vary in size, with populations of 72 to 163 households, or from 480 to 1,100 people, in 1979. They are grouped in two communes, Nong Muun Than and Phon Muang, separated by 25–35 kilometers, or 60–80 minutes by car (See Map 2). At the time of the survey there was practically no sealed road in the entire district. Each village was accessible by car at all seasons of the year, although this had been true only since the creation of new minor roads under the Tambon Development Program, inaugurated in 1975. Prior to that year access by vehicle during the rainy season, from June through October, was at best uncertain. Even the present roads occasionally become impassable through flooding and erosion. Transport services are now generally good, there being many privately run motorcycles, minibuses, and pick-up trucks available for passengers.

As for commercial services, each of the six villages has at least one rice mill. The larger villages each have one or two shops selling basic household goods. Each village has a primary school; one village–

MAP 2 The study villages in Atsamat District, Roi-et Province



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Nong Muun Than—also has a secondary school for children up to the age of 15.[1]

A second, complementary survey was conducted in Bangkok and included 788 people who had moved from any Northeastern province and were currently working in the capital. The sampling method in this case was purposive in nature, thus avoiding the enormous problems of obtaining an equal probability sample of Northeastern migrants in a city of 5 million people. Interviewers were instructed to search in parts of Bangkok known to have concentrations of Northeasterners, such as the Hua Lampong area, and gradually to build up lists of places where individuals could be interviewed. In all cases interviews were conducted, with the employers' approval, at places of work. We used quotas to ensure that the sample included adequate numbers in various occupations. The survey yielded valuable insights into movers' experiences in Bangkok; nevertheless, the nature of the sample means that any inferences about the total population of Northeasterners in the city must be made with great caution.

Tables 2 and 3 summarize the distribution of the Bangkok sample by occupation and by province of origin. On the basis of National Statistical Office (NSO) surveys of migrants in Bangkok, it seems likely that Northeasterners working in government jobs were overrepresented in our sample, whereas those in laboring and factory employment were underrepresented (NSO, 1978a). Noteworthy is the large number of movers from Roi-et (Table 3), particularly in relation to the total population of the province (see Table 1), which confirms that the high rate of out-movement to Bangkok identified in the 1970 census was continuing.

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1 One final point should be made concerning data collection in the study villages. The survey was conducted in conjunction with a controlled experiment in the use of information as a means of redirecting movement toward Northeastern towns as opposed to Bangkok. The results of that experiment are discussed elsewhere (Fuller and Lightfoot, 1982). Briefly, the level of movement to towns within the Northeastern region increased during the seven-month period when the information program operated, for particular groups of villagers in three out of the six study villages. Owing to aggregation for the purposes of the present paper, however, few of the figures presented below have been noticeably affected by the information program. A few instances in which figures may have been distorted in this way are footnoted.

TABLE 2 Northeastern migrants in Bangkok: distribution of the sample by occupation

Occupation	Number	Percentage
Unskilled laborer	72	9.1
Servant or housekeeper	102	12.9
Construction worker	90	11.4
Bus conductor or driver	93	11.8
Repairman or skilled worker	84	10.7
Government official or worker	110	14.0
Entertainer (singer, actor, etc.)	45	5.7
Vendor	47	6.0
Service provider	60	7.6
Factory worker	72	9.1
Professional	12	1.5
Unknown	1	0.1
All occupations	788	99.9

NOTE: Percentages do not sum to 100.0 because of rounding.

SOURCE: Survey of Northeasterners in Bangkok.

MOBILITY RATES

The high rates of mobility among Roi-et people stem from long-established traditions of movement. The Thai-Lao people are relative newcomers to the Northeast of Thailand, and migration associated with the filling-in of the settlement pattern is continuing in some areas (Ng, 1969). There is a long tradition of movement to avoid the occasionally unreasonable demands by local princes for rice and labor. Moreover, there is the tradition of *pay thiaw,* according to which young men, often in groups, travel in search of adventure, money, and wives (Kirsch, 1966). Finally, Buddhist monks have traveled extensively in certain seasons of the year for educational purposes, establishing links between temples; and those links in turn have been conducive to moves of a more secular kind. Much of the movement between the Northeast and Bangkok before about 1950 seems to have been related to links established between monks and temples.[2] There is no evidence

2 There is evidence from Northern Thailand that, at least in the area of Chiangkham, movement in association with trade in the late nineteenth century was considerably more extensive than is generally realized (Moerman, 1975). The

TABLE 3 Northeastern migrants in Bangkok: distribution of the sample by province of origin

Province	Number	Percentage
Ubon Ratchathani	116	14.7
Roi-et	91	11.5
Nakhon Ratchasima	77	9.8
Khon Kaen	67	8.5
Surin	58	7.4
Yasothon[a]	57	7.2
Chaiyaphum	51	6.5
Udonthani	46	5.8
Mahasarakham	39	4.9
Sisaket	37	4.7
Sakon Nakhon	37	4.7
Kalasin	32	4.1
Buriram	27	3.4
Nongkhai	26	3.3
Nakhon Phanom	23	2.9
Loei	3	0.4
Province not stated	1	0.1
All provinces	788	99.9

NOTE: Percentages do not sum to 100.0 because of rounding.

a Yasothon was created out of Ubon Ratchathani Province after the 1970 census.

SOURCE: Survey of Northeasterners in Bangkok.

as to whether people from Atsamat joined the seasonal movement of Northeasterners to farms in the Central Region in the early decades of this century (Johnston, 1976). Studies in Bangkok as well as data from this study show that movement from Roi-et to the capital was well established by the mid-1950s. Several members of the study villages had made what was then a difficult journey, walking for most of the 150 kilometers to the railway station at Ban Phai.

Rural-to-urban movement has become an integral part of the social and economic life of the six study villages. Depending somewhat on the time of year, there is either a noticeable absence of young people and many heads of households, or a constant coming and going as

historical significance of trade in initiating population movements in the Northeastern Region is still to be explored.

movers leave their villages and return from their temporary stays in town. Even those who have not moved recently have friends and relatives in town; and opportunities, problems, and acquaintances in town are common topics of conversation.

Among the population of ages 10 and over who were regarded as members of the sampled households in 1979, 23 percent had spent some time in town during the preceding three years. During the three-year reference period a total of 962 rural-urban moves were made by 442 people out of a total of 1,923 people in 356 households. Movement had occurred from 77 percent of all sampled households.

This movement was heavily oriented toward the city of Bangkok, the destination for 57 percent of all rural-to-urban moves. Sixteen percent of the population over the age of 10 had spent some time in Bangkok during the three years, 59 percent of all households had some form of migratory link with the capital, and in some cases as many as four household members had moved there. By comparison, only 32 percent of the households had migratory links with any Northeastern town, and only 7 percent of the population over the age of 10 had moved to any town within the Northeast Region. Less than 1 percent had moved to both Bangkok and a Northeastern town and about 1 percent had moved to other towns besides Bangkok and those in the Northeast.

Most of the moves were circular and involved fairly short periods spent in towns at any one stretch. Among movers who had visited Bangkok and were in the study villages during the survey period, 31 percent had stayed in Bangkok for 30 days or less. But 41 percent had stayed for longer than 90 days on any one visit. Most of those who had moved had done so more than once, the mean number of moves being 2.2 per person.

Before investigating the processes underlying these rather starkly presented figures it is instructive to compare the rates derived from this study with those of the census and registration system. The 1970 census indicates that the number of people moving from Roi-et to Bangkok during the period 1965–70 amounted to only 1.6 percent of the population 5 years old and over living in Roi-et Province in 1970 (Table 1). A more recent source, the residential register, records a rate of out-movement from Roi-et to all destinations of 1.6 percent per year for the period 1975–77. The differences between the census and registration system figures may reflect in part an increased rate of

movement during the 1970s. The more important differences lie between those two rates and that from the surveys of the six study villages. Owing to their short duration, most of the moves recorded in the course of this study would be missed by both of the other two sources. The registration system would miss them because people are unlikely to go to the trouble of registering their moves when they expect, as most movers do, to return sooner or later to their home villages. The number of out-moves actually registered for people still living who had once lived in the six study villages amounted to only 10 percent of the total number of people absent from the villages at the time of the survey. The census would miss most of the short-term moves, even if they happened to coincide with the time at which the census was conducted, because it records place of residence on a *de jure* rather than a *de facto* basis.

Therefore, although both the census and the registration system identify Roi-et as a province with a greater than average rate of out-migration, those sources greatly understate the total volume of movement that has been taking place. Movement is dominated by short-term, repeated, circular moves rather than by once-only rural-to-urban transfers of the Roi-et population. Both the survey and the census data show that Bangkok is by far the most important destination. A question that cannot at present be answered is whether similar relationships among census, registration, and village survey data could be identified in other Thai provinces.

NETWORKS

The networks of interest are the household, the labor-exchange group (which in some respects is an extension of the household within the village), the peer group, and patron-client links. After outlining the main characteristics of these networks that are relevant to rural-to-urban movement, we assess their effects and the ways in which they are affected by movement, focusing on selected characteristics of movers, the spatial patterns of moves, the timing and duration of moves, and the movers' experiences in towns.

The household consists of relatives who live together most of the time and share work responsibilities and a common purse. The size of households in the study villages ranged from two to 14 persons; the mean was 6.8. Such figures fail to show the almost continuous state of change in a household, as children mature and take on increasing

economic roles, making both demands on and contributions to the household as a whole. When they marry, an associated change is the addition of a spouse to the household or the departure of the married son or daughter to a different household, accompanied by the gain or loss of the brideprice. With these variations in size and structure, households have varying degrees of ability and inclination to respond through migration to economic hardships or to capitalize on opportunities caused by general economic development. Household size and composition might therefore influence not only the propensity to move, but also the tendency toward economic differentiation so often observed within villages.

The usual pattern is for husbands to move into the houses of their parents-in-law in the early years of marriage, before setting up a separate household. It is considered normal for the youngest daughter and her husband to stay on in her parents' house, which they eventually inherit. Consequently, the composition of a household tends to pass through several stages, beginning with the young nuclear family and followed by two or three married children and their spouses residing there with their own children; gradually the married children depart, leaving the youngest daughter with her own family and a surviving parent.

This dynamic, changing nature of interpersonal relations within the household is important to bear in mind when assessing the influence of the household on rural-to-urban movement. In spite of commonly repeated assertions about the strength of the household as a social unit in peasant societies, and in the Thai case about the importance of *bun khun*[3] in cementing relations among households, there is a constant process of disintegration and reformulation of households. The Thai literature presents two quite different interpretations of how the household network affects and is affected by the process of movement from rural to urban areas.

Lefferts (1974), in his analysis of daily commuting into the city of Khon Kaen, represented the urban economy as an opportunity for farm families and villages to increase their resources through income-earning activities. Commuting of household members, he suggested, was an attempt by household heads to extend the income-earning potential of the household. We may extend this view by portraying at

3 The term *bun khun* refers to children's sense of continued obligation to their parents, in reciprocation for their parents' care for them as children.

least some household heads as encouraging their children to take advantage of whatever urban opportunities are available, in the interests of both the child and, through remittances of cash, the household. This interpretation is consistent at the microlevel with Griffin's (1976) broader view of out-movement as beneficial to rural economies. In contrast, Klausner (1972) saw increased rates of movement by young people from Ubonratchathani to Bangkok as a sign of the breakdown of family and village society, and particularly of losses of labor in the village in defiance of the wishes of older village residents. Thus in Griffin's view the family plays a positive role in migration to the city and benefits from it, whereas according to Klausner the family is the unwilling victim of whatever processes outside the household give rise to movement to town.

It appears at first sight that family conflicts over decisions about moving to town are unlikely to arise, because most household heads seem to favor urbanward movement by household members. They percieve there to be more economic and other advantages than disadvantages to themselves and to the movers. For most household heads, however, support for the idea of moving is equivocal: many would prefer their children to move to towns within the Northeastern Region than to Bangkok, mainly because the shorter distances involved would enable movers to return to the village more frequently (Lightfoot et al., 1981).

In Roi-et there was considerably more willingness among household heads to have their sons move than for their daughters to leave home. The reason for this preference was that heads feared more for their daughters than for their sons in town, but they generally considered daughters to be more reliable in sending money home to the household. Most importantly, household heads' support for moving was conditional upon the mover returning each planting and harvest season, so that there would be no significant loss of family labor on the farm. This proviso was strongly expressed by many household heads.

Although many prospective movers acknowledged their parents' influence on moving decisions, it would be an exaggeration to say that household heads controlled the movements of all members of their households. Among respondents 15–39 years of age who were not themselves household heads, 65 percent said they would follow the advice of their household head concerning any move; thus over a third would apparently not feel constrained in this way. Almost half (47

percent) of the Northeasterners interviewed in Bangkok said that their parents had not approved of their decisions to move.

Labor-exchange groups consist of households, usually within a single village, that cooperate in performing tasks requiring more labor than is available within each household individually. A few members from as many as ten households help with the planting, harvesting, or threshing of rice, or with less regular tasks such as house construction. There is an understanding that each participating household will benefit in proportion to the assistance it contributes to the group. The precise nature of such *long khaek* agreements varies from place to place and over time; the agreements often include the provision of food for the workers by each "host" in turn, and may extend to some form of assistance for member households whose crops fail.

The labor-exchange network is composed of households rather than individuals, and if it affects the propensity of any individual to move it does so through the household head. He is aware that having a household member move to town during the planting or harvest season will entail not only a loss of that member's labor, but also a reduction or loss of the benefits of membership in the labor-exchange group, most importantly the ability to call on a relatively large labor force at crucial periods in the agricultural calendar. Similarly, the absence of individuals at those times affects the labor-exchange group as a whole through the household, resulting in a reduction of both total labor and the level of cooperation among households.

The importance of labor-exchange groups has declined considerably throughout Northeastern Thailand as a result of the general monetization of the economy. Independently of rural-to-urban movement, people with enough land and a large enough cash income are able to pay for farm labor, and this has helped undermine the cooperative principle of the *long khaek* tradition.

Peer groups consist of friends, usually of the same sex and of about the same age and economic, social, and political standing. They may overlap to a considerable extent with labor-exchange groups. In Northeastern Thai culture much value is put on friendship and the maintenance of peer-group relations, as encapsulated in the prevalent concept of *phuuk siaw* ("binding together"), or solidarity and loyalty among friends. These relations may be highly influential networks in conditioning the movement process, in several ways. They represent the most immediately accessible social grouping outside of the household;

and any ideas, information, or obligations that are circulated within the networks almost inevitably carry a good deal of weight. Moreover, peer groups have often cooperated in both traditional and modern movements to either rural or urban areas, and this shared experience has reinforced the structure of the groups. There are many stories about four, six, or ten young men leaving the village together in search of work. Johnston (1976) has written of much larger groups moving from the Northeast to the Central Plain in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Household heads in our study villages reported that they worried less about their children who moved in groups, which are believed to afford both protection and a source of continued contact with the village, than they did about children who left home alone. Thus the existence of peer groups not only increases the prospective movers' confidence about moving, but also serves to neutralize a household head's opposition to his son's or daughter's move. There are cases of friends alternating their urban visits, taking turns to stay in the same room in town and to look after each other's village responsibilities. Finally, the long experience of cityward movement in the villages means that most peer groups include at any one moment at least one member who is in town. Eighty percent of respondents of ages 15–39 in our study knew and could provide personal details of at least one such person, and it was common for respondents to know half a dozen or more temporary or permanent urban dwellers. Most of these urban contacts were from the same village, but in some cases they included people whom the respondent had met on a previous visit to town. Contact was maintained with friends in town both directly through occasional visits in both directions and through letters and messages taken by other circular movers. Such friends were crucially important as sources of information about jobs and other opportunities in town, and they were almost always considered able and willing to provide housing and help in looking for work should a villager move to town.

Much has been written about the role of patron-client relationships in Thai and other Southeast Asian societies (Scott and Kerkvliet, 1973; Rabibhadana, 1969; Mulder, 1978). The term "patron-client relationship" is used here in a broad sense, to indicate a dyadic relationship rather than a network, one involving people at different social, economic, and political levels, and which is defined by those differences in levels. The more powerful partner in the relationship, with

greater access to a variety of resources, is able to help his clients gain some degree of access to those resources. Scott and Kerkvliet differentiate patron-client links from other vertical, dyadic ties that are more functional or coercive. Patron-client links "involve a diffuse and flexible pattern of reciprocity between a powerful man and his follower" (p. 244). The tie is more one of friendship than of contract, and the rewards to each partner lie in nonmaterial and indirectly material benefits such as "loyalty" and "protection," as well as in directly material advantages. Nevertheless, Scott and Kerkvliet (1973) and Siamwalla (1980) discuss the transformation of many patron-client links toward more functional and exploitive forms as part of the process of modernization. For today's Northeastern Thai villager, patrons may be bureaucrats, politicians, or simply wealthy men who are in a position to help their clients, or *luk nongs,* by giving work, administrative favors, or advice, or by lending money, land, or goods in exchange for labor, rent, and loyalty. They may also be local traders or money lenders who are powerful enough to dictate or strongly influence local rates for interest, wages, and crop prices, particularly where poor farmers have no choice but to sell rights to their crops in order to survive financially until harvest time.

Like peer groups, patron-client links in Roi-et commonly extend into urban areas and influence rural-to-urban movement. Urban-based patrons are in a position not only to help migrants to find work, but also to provide work. They may be employers themselves, or foremen who prefer to hire people whom they already know or have heard about from others. They assist the newcomers because they benefit from a degree of continuity in their labor force, and from knowing something of the origins of their workers, or because they have some personal link with the village and a resulting sense of obligation. Textor (1961) and Scott (1976) have noted cases in which patron loyalties have been mobilized for political purposes within Bangkok. Patrons' favors in urban areas, like those in villages, often extend beyond simply providing work; they commonly include the provision of shelter.

Our study of Northeasterners in Bangkok showed that 47 percent of circular movers stayed with their employers. Such hospitality on the part of patrons is even more common for migrants working in the construction industry, where temporary accommodation is provided on the site as a matter of course. But the number of movers and prospective movers who knew patrons able to provide work was quite

small even in such a high-mobility area as Roi-et, where one would expect the proportion to be higher than elsewhere: 5 percent of respondents, including some with and others without the experience of having moved to town themselves, knew someone who they said was in a position to provide employment.

No doubt it is partly because of the links provided by both patron-client and peer-group networks that those in the study villages with a history of circular movement reported little difficulty in finding work in town. To the extent that recent movers do face an unemployment problem, as in the case reported by Chamratrithirong (1979) of the 12 percent of males and 9 percent of females who failed to find work after over 90 days in Bangkok, the problem may be greatest for those moving from areas without the well-established rural-urban interaction networks that exist in the study villages.

One must also bear in mind the propensity of rural Thais to make decisions and act independently of social and economic networks. The independence of individuals and the resulting "loose structure" of Thai society have been widely discussed in the sociological literature (Embree, 1950; Evers, 1969; Mulder, 1978). When asked the reasons for a particular decision, and who influenced them, many farmers claim not to have had or needed any advice, and to have acted on their own initiative. This pattern of behavior has become more plausible with the coming of mass communications. Most households now have radios, visiting mobile theaters occasionally show movies, and in the study villages contact with towns is so common that most residents have at least a generalized image of city life. Nevertheless, the key questions are not whether social and economic networks condition movement, but how much and in what ways they do so, allowing greater or lesser latitude for individuals; and what the effects of movement are on other members of those networks.

SPATIAL PATTERNS OF MOVEMENT

The migration literature includes many accounts of movers following relatives and friends to the same town and even to the same area of town, the same boarding house, the same type of work, and the same employer. The result is that underlying the aggregate patterns of movement between provinces and regions are highly place-specific routes linking particular villages with particular urban destinations, established and sustained through the medium of information and offers of

help sent or taken back by earlier movers. Much movement in Thailand conforms to such micropatterns. Most people in the villages of Roi-et moved only when they knew of a specific job and place to stay; and information about both almost invariably came from either the movers' own experience and urban contacts, or from fellow villagers already in town. Destinations for working males were most commonly construction sites, factories, and taxi-driving jobs, in many instances obtained through the same foremen or taxi-fleet owners. Female movers, who according to Chamratrithirong (1979) are more likely than males to have arranged a job before moving, tended to work in factories and as house servants. They too depended heavily on friends from their home villages for information about these jobs. Repeated moves to relatively specialized industries engender skills and a useful familiarity with those industries, as Stretton (1981) has demonstrated with respect to construction workers in Manila. Skills reinforce the influence of peer-group and patron-client networks on the prospective mover's choice of destination.

As we noted earlier, most movement from Roi-et was to Bangkok. There were also links between the study villages and the tin industry in southern Thailand; sugar refineries in Kanchanaburi, a province beyond Bangkok, but from which trucks were sent once a year to recruit and transport laborers to the sugar areas for the harvest period (Breman, 1978/79); the sea-going fishing industry of Chantaburi; and some towns within the Northeast, particularly Roi-et and Khon Kaen. But most of these links were specific to particular households and groups of households, and, significantly, there was no village-wide pool of information about urban opportunities. Thus households and peer groups within villages were important networks for conditioning destination choices. As we reported earlier, household heads preferred their household members to move to Northeastern towns, and the orientation of most moves toward Bangkok suggests some degree of conflict between the heads' preferences and the spatial distribution of prospective movers' urban contacts. Most movers would not consider going to any town other than Bangkok because they had no information about opportunities elsewhere, and no friends or relatives with whom to stay.

One should be careful not to overstate the importance of village-urban networks in determining destination choices, especially in view of the Thai predilection for personal freedom. Once in town movers

become involved in urban networks, often quite independently of any links with their home villages. Our data indicate that "branching out" socially is usually a slow, difficult, and not particularly necessary or desirable process for the Northeasterner. Nevertheless, Chamratrithirong (1979) found that after less than six months in Bangkok 21 percent of male and 16 percent of female movers from all regions had established "very close" relationships with new city-based neighbors. He also observed an associated tendency toward increasingly "urban" behavior patterns among movers to Bangkok.

One would expect that with increased urban experience a mover would be less likely to follow well-trodden village-city routes and more likely to establish new routes for villagers whom he or she was sponsoring. Consequently, within a broad framework the microlevel spatial patterns of rural-to-urban moves can be expected to be in an almost constant state of change. Nevertheless, most changes in destinations on successive visits occur within the same city; as we noted earlier, only 1 percent of the population of the study villages had moved to both Bangkok and a Northeastern town during the three-year reference period. One result of the importance of personal networks in initiating and maintaining rural-to-urban movement is a great deal of inertia in the general spatial orientations of movement. Regardless of the actual distribution of jobs and other opportunities, prospective movers almost always follow their friends and relatives to the same towns, if not to the same jobs, unless other equally credible information networks are established to link them with alternative destinations.

CHARACTERISTICS OF MOVERS

Demographic and household characteristics

Although there are occasional conflicts within households as to who should move, where, and when, the variations in propensity to move shown in Table 4 show that social constraints on movement continue to operate with considerable effect within the villages, making rural-to-urban movement a highly selective process. Without at this stage making any distinction by duration or frequency of absence, we see that the highest rates of movement occurred among single people in the age group 25–29. In fact, for single people of both sexes the propensity to move increased steadily till the age of 30, after which the

TABLE 4 Proportions of Northeastern villagers who moved at least once during 1976–79, by marital status, relation to household head, sex, and age group

Marital status, relation to head, and sex	Age group													
	10–14		15–19		20–24		25–29		30–39		40–49		50+	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
MARRIED														
Head														
Male					2	*	9	44	70	39	70	17	104	5
Female[a]					6	17	17	0	90	4	71	0	77	1
Not head														
Male	1	*	5	40	36	53	49	41	60	28	13	23	8	0
Female[a]	1	*	13	31	62	32	41	12	42	5	5	0	7	0
SINGLE														
Head														
Male									3	*			2	*
Female							2	*	1	*	1	*	1	*
Not head														
Male	183	2	181	44	104	68	43	77	11	45	3	*		
Female	173	5	163	52	65	62	8	75	7	0	3	*	1	*
WIDOWED/DIVORCED														
Male			1	*			2	*	3	*	3	*	16	0
Female					3	*	3	*	5	20	16	6	52	0

* Sample size (fewer than 5) too small for percentage to be meaningful.

a In the case of females, "head" is defined as head of household or wife of head.

SOURCE: Survey of villagers in Atsamat District, Roi-et Province.

numbers become too small to make confident statements. This increase is obscured by the fact that the greatest numbers of movers are considerably younger, 37 percent under the age of 20 and 67 percent under the age of 25 in our sample. The high rates of movement for young females, higher than the rates for males up to the age of 20, reflect the increasing mobility of Thai women noted by Arnold (1978). This mobility of young women is curious in view of many household heads' reluctance to have their daughters move, and particularly because female movers are more likely than their male counterparts to move to Bangkok, the least-favored urban destination from household heads' viewpoint. The Bangkok bias among female movers probably reflects the greater availability of opportunities there for female employment; but the generally high propensity of young unmarried women to move indicates the importance of social and economic networks outside the household in overcoming the preferences and in some cases the commands of household heads with respect to their children's behavior.

Table 4 shows that marriage reduces the propensity to move. Its effect is understated in this table because many of the moves recorded for persons who were married at the time of our interviews probably occurred while those persons were still single. The figures strongly suggest that marriage limits female mobility far more than male mobility, especially for women who are either heads or wives of heads of households: 39 percent of married male heads of households in the 30–39 age group had moved during the three-year reference period, compared with only 4 percent of women who were married and either heads or wives of heads.

Married men of ages 25–39 were more likely to have moved if they were heads of households than if they were living as subordinate members of an extended family. One reason may be that as household heads they had greater decision-making power than other men and were thus more able to take advantage of urban opportunities. But the principal reason is that they were heads of relatively young, nuclear families in which they had the greatest potential for generating income. Their households lacked adult labor for the farm, and therefore opportunities for increasing income within the village were very limited; and there was no one else within their households capable of seeking work in town. The propensity of these heads to move was therefore a rational response to difficult circumstances while the household was passing through a particular stage.

Economic characteristics

Whatever the role is of household size and structure in influencing the moving decisions of members, one would expect economic status to have an important influence on such decisions. Analysis at the level of the individual is hampered, however, by two complicating factors. First, the individual's perception of economic circumstances may be more important than his or her actual economic level in the decision-making process. Perceived economic level is a function of the interplay among the household, peer-group, and patron-client networks, for it is from information acquired and assimilated through the last two that any sense of relative wealth or deprivation, or of opportunities elsewhere, is established in the mind of the individual villager. Consequently, a poor household apparently most in need of having a member go to earn money in town may be constrained from doing so by its exclusion from peer-group and patron-client networks that make urban opportunities familiar and accessible. Second, the relationship between economic well-being, whether perceived or absolute, and propensity to move is not linear. Although, for example, Roi-et's high level of out-movement may be attributed to general poverty, the migration literature indicates that the poorest individuals within any locality are not necessarily the most likely to move to town. Some, such as those who have lost their land, may be driven to move as a matter of survival, but such cases are unusual in Northeastern Thailand. Moving to town in search of an alternative or supplementary source of livelihood involves risk, and the poorest are the least likely to take chances that may jeopardize whatever slender resources they have. In contrast, the relatively wealthy are most able to withstand the loss of some family labor and the costs of moving, and can therefore capitalize on urban opportunities. Bearing these points in mind, there is no reason to expect simple relationships between measures of economic welfare and propensity to move.

Since rice farming was the principal occupation and source of income for 93 percent of the households, farm size is an indication of economic level. The mean area of land farmed was 4.6 hectares (29 *rai*) per household, and as shown in Table 5 most farmers were owners of their land. Eighty-six percent owned all the land that they used; renting neither to nor from others; 9 percent rented some or all of their land from others; 4 percent rented some or all of their land to others. Renting to others was associated with an inadequate supply of

TABLE 5 Percentage distribution of households by land-ownership class and township

Class	Nong Muun Than	Phon Muang	Total
No land owned or used	2	1	1
None owned, all rented from others	6	2	4
Some owned, some rented from others	4	6	5
All owned, none rented from or to others	82	89	86
Some owned, some rented to others	5	1	3
All land rented to others	2	1	1
All classes	101	100	100

SOURCE: Survey of villagers in Atsamat District, Roi-et Province.

family labor, as in cases where the male household head had died or left, rather than with a particularly large size of holding. There were only the earliest signs of the emergence of a true rentier class within these villages, which were characteristic in this respect of most of Northeastern Thailand.

Nevertheless there were considerable variations in the size and adequacy of farms within the area. As shown in Table 6 a large group of farmers may be described as having an intermediate level of economic well-being. Almost one half (47 percent) of all farmers owned from 0.24 to 0.71 hectares of paddy land for each member of the household; few in this group rented to or from others. Some farmers were considerably better off than the average, however. The median amount of land owned was 0.56 hectares per household member, but 21 percent had over 0.96, and 12 percent had over 1.2 hectares. At the lower end of the scale were households markedly disadvantaged even by local standards. Seventeen percent of the households owned under 0.24 hectares per household member, including 5 percent who owned no land at all. Almost half of those owning 0.16 hectares or less per household member used rented land either exclusively or to supplement what they owned.

To measure perceived economic level, we asked respondents whether they considered their land adequate to meet the economic needs of their households. Their responses were subjective and did not necessarily bear much relationship to an outsider's view of what was adequate. Sixty-nine percent of the household heads said their land

TABLE 6 Movement rates by amount of land owned per person and perceived adequacy of land

Amount owned (hectares) per person	Farm-size class and adequacy of land (*rai*[a])	Percent of sample	Percentage in each class with movers to: All towns	Bangkok	NE towns
<0.24	<1.5				
	Adequate	5	83	61	22
	Not adequate	12	70	63	25
	Total	17	75	62	24
0.24–0.47	1.5–2.9				
	Adequate	17	65	51	28
	Not adequate	10	77	69	23
	Total	27	68	58	26
0.48–0.71	3.0–4.4				
	Adequate	16	83	63	67
	Not adequate	4	60	53	20
	Total	20	78	61	42
0.72–0.95	4.5–5.9				
	Adequate	12	78	68	32
	Not adequate	3	60	40	10
	Total	15	75	63	27
0.96–1.19	6.0–7.4				
	Adequate	7	79	67	25
	Not adequate	2	67	50	17
	Total	9	77	63	23
1.2+	7.5+				
	Adequate	12	78	42	48
	Not adequate	0.3	0	0	0
	Total	12	76	41	46
	All classes				
	Adequate	69	76	58	36
	Not adequate	31	69	60	21
	Total	100	74	58	31

a 6.25 *rai* = 1 hectare.

SOURCE: Survey of villagers in Atsamat District, Roi-et Province.

was adequate, but there were some who were satisfied or dissatisfied in each farm-size category (Table 6). Over a quarter (29 percent) of those with less than 0.24 hectares per household member said they had enough land, and one of the 37 household heads owning 1.2

hectares or more per person said his land was inadequate. Although these responses partly reflect variations in land quality, it is also true that aspiration levels vary widely among households. Nevertheless, in general the proportions of respondents considering their land adequate were greatest among households who had the most land per household member.

Table 6 shows no relationship between area of farmland per person and propensity to move to town. When households are grouped by farm-size per household member, irrespective of land adequacy, the proportion of households from which movement had occurred varied only between 68 and 78 percent, and no discernible pattern suggests a direct link between the two variables. On disaggregating the groups according to perceived adequacy of land, we find that movement rates were somewhat higher among those who judged their land to be adequate than among those who considered it inadequate. With all farm-size classes combined, 76 percent of households with "adequate" land had experienced some rural-to-urban movement, but this was true for a smaller proportion (69 percent) of those with "inadequate" land. The difference in migration experience is in the same direction within five of the six land classes.

When the farm-size classes are disaggregated according to destination, the tendency toward higher mobility rates among households with "adequate" land is more pronounced for those who moved to Northeastern towns than for those who moved to Bangkok. Among all land classes, 36 percent of those with "adequate" land reported some movement to Northeastern towns, compared with only 21 percent among those with "inadequate" land. In the case of migrants to Bangkok, in contrast, there was virtually no difference between those with "adequate" and those with "inadequate" land: 58 compared with 60 percent. Similarly, the highest rates of movement to Northeastern towns occurred among those having the largest farms; within that size class, the rate of movement to Northeast towns was greater than the rate of movement to Bangkok. This difference in economic level is related to the fact that the population of movers to Bangkok included a higher proportion of persons moving in search of work, whereas movers to Northeastern towns included a higher proportion going to continue their education. Moving for the latter reason, with its high short-term costs, can be interpreted as a strategy for consolidating or capitalizing on an already satisfactory economic situation, whereas

moving in search of work was motivated in many cases by a desire to meet basic family needs that could not be met within the village.

TIMING AND DURATION OF MOVES

The traditional, subsistence-oriented, and almost monocultural farming system of the study villages has important influences on the rural-to-urban movement process. The low productivity of the farms and their incapacity to yield a dependable cash income are important contributory causes of outward movement. In addition, rice farming without the aid of artificial irrigation is a highly seasonal activity. Northeastern Thailand has two annual peaks of labor input, during July and August for planting and during December for the harvest. At other times of the year there is little work to be done on the farms. Hence the timing and duration of rural-urban moves are important to household heads who want the benefits of a cash income to the household from urban employment, without reducing the work force of the household at crucial farming periods.

Table 7 shows, for a total of 1,923 people ten years old and over in 356 households, the numbers who were in Bangkok, in a Northeastern town, or in any other towns for part or all of each agricultural season over the three-year period of our study. Table 8 shows movements for the same group by duration of move for the year prior to August 1979. The precise timing of each farm season was defined during the interviews according to the work patterns of each particular household.

These aggregated figures reveal a seasonal pattern of movement, for both tables show variations by season in rates of absence from the villages. Seasonal variation is most pronounced in relation to movement to Bangkok. In each year the highest rates of absence occurred after the harvest and before the following planting season, a period of about six months for most households. In each year approximately twice as many people were absent in that season as in the preceding harvest season (Table 7).[4] Generally, movers were more likely to return to their villages for the harvest season than for the planting season. The conventional conclusion would be that most movement is seasonal and therefore reasonably well articulated with the labor needs of local farming systems. This conclusion would be consistent with the

4 The high rates of movement to Northeastern towns in the two seasons immediately prior to the 1979 survey ("before planting" and "planting" in 1979) result at least in part from the information program.

TABLE 7 Locations of villagers, by agricultural season

Season	In rural area throughout	In town for part or all of season				
		Bangkok	North-eastern town	Other town	Total No.	Total %
Planting, 1979	1,675	148	83	17	248	13
Before planting, 1979	1,623	210	75	15	300	16
Harvest, 1978	1,765	96	54	8	158	8
Before harvest, 1978	1,662	194	58	9	261	14
Planting, 1978	1,770	97	50	6	153	8
Before planting, 1978	1,659	198	58	8	264	14
Harvest, 1977	1,798	80	39	6	125	7
Before harvest, 1977	1,703	168	49	3	220	11
Planting, 1977	1,798	75	47	3	125	7
Before planting, 1977	1,708	160	47	8	215	11
Harvest, 1976	1,818	64	36	5	105	5
Before harvest, 1976	1,738	137	42	6	185	10

NOTE: N = 1,923; data are missing for a small number of cases in each season.

SOURCE: Survey of villagers in Atsamat District, Roi-et Province.

popular view in Thailand of the nature of movement between the Northeast and Bangkok.

However, far more complex temporal patterns of movement emerge when the movements of individuals are considered. They suggest that the term "seasonal" not only is simplistic, but also disguises an important lack of articulation between rural-urban movement and the farming calendar. Table 8 indicates that many absences last for less than whole seasons, particularly in the long "before planting" season. Tables 9 and 10 show the variety of circulation regimes followed by individual movers, and the varying character and spatial orientation of people associated with different regimes.

In Table 9 the movers are categorized by the temporal patterns of their moves to towns. Those in town for only one season during the three years constitute 21 percent of the total. Fifty-two percent of those single-season movers were under the age of 20 (Table 10), and a majority (56 percent) had moved during one or the other of the two seasons immediately preceding the 1979 survey.[5] Thus these movers

5 The high incidence of single-season movers in those two seasons probably resulted from the information program described earlier. The program had its

TABLE 8 Numbers and percentages of villagers by portion of agricultural season spent in town

Season	Portion of season and number or percentage of villagers									
	None		Some		Half		Most		All	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Planting, 1979	1,675	87	16	1	12	1	44	2	168	9
Before planting, 1979	1,623	84	29	2	13	1	59	3	192	10
Harvest, 1978	1,765	92	6	0.3	1	0.05	30	2	121	6
Before harvest, 1978	1,662	86	8	0.4	5	0.3	36	2	212	11

NOTE: N = 1,923; data are missing for a small number of cases in each season.

SOURCE: Survey of villagers in Atsamat District, Roi-et Province.

TABLE 9 Patterns of absence, by agricultural season, for villagers who moved to town during 1976–79

Movers, by length and timing of absence	Number	Percentage
Those absent during 1 season		
Farming season	40	9
Nonfarming season	51	12
Total	**91**	**21**
Those absent during 2+ seasons but not more than 1 season at a time		
Farming seasons only	5	1
Nonfarming seasons only	85	19
Both farming and nonfarming seasons	11	2
Total	**101**	**23**
Those absent during 2+ seasons consecutively		
One consecutive series of seasons	145	33
2+ seasons away separated by periods at home of 1+ seasons	105	24
Total	**250**	**57**
All movers	**442**	**101**

NOTE: Percentages do not sum to 100 because of rounding.

SOURCE: Survey of villagers in Atsamat District, Roi-et Province.

were mainly young people at the start of their moving careers. Interestingly, the number of single-season movers (40) who moved during a farming season was almost equal to the number (51) who had moved during a nonfarming season. With the exception of those moving in the two most recent seasons, who would most likely continue to move subsequently, few people had moved only once to town and not either stayed for an additional season or returned on a later occasion. In other words, few people either achieve their goals or give up as rural-to-urban movers within one season.

A further 23 percent had been in town during two or more seasons,

greatest effects among those with little or no recent history of movement. Of the "single-season" movers who moved in the two seasons, 39 percent went to Northeastern towns, 53 percent to Bangkok, and 8 percent to other towns. The slightly higher than usual proportion going to Northeastern towns (Table 10), consistent with the aims of the information program, further suggests that these figures were affected by the program.

TABLE 10 Percentage distribution of villagers who moved to town during 1976–79, by age, sex, destination, and length and timing of absence

Age group, sex, and destination	Length and timing of absence			
	1 season only (N = 91)	6 non-farm seasons (N = 40)	All 12 seasons (N = 57)	All other rural/urban movers (N = 254)
Age group				
10–19	52	23	32	39
20–29	26	43	58	48
30–39	13	18	7	10
40–49	5	13	4	2
50+	2	5	0	1
All age groups	98	102	101	100
Sex				
Male	64	75	63	59
Female	36	26	37	41
Both sexes	100	101	100	100
Destination				
Bangkok	62	95	67	72
NE towns	32	10	39	30
Other towns	9	3	5	6
All destinations	103	108	111	108

NOTE: Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding. Percentages for destinations sum to more than 100 because some persons went to two categories of towns during the three years.

SOURCE: Survey of villagers in Atsamat District, Roi-et Province.

but never in two consecutive seasons. Most of them (19 percent of the total) were truly seasonal movers, in that they had confined their absences to nonfarming seasons. Forty (9 percent) had been absent during all six nonfarming seasons, returning each time for the following harvest or planting season.

These 40 were a particularly interesting group because their pattern of movements corresponded to the popular notion that circulation in Thailand is a seasonal phenomenon. Far from being typical, however, they were a very distinctive group (Table 10). They constituted a small minority of all those who were involved in urbanward movement

during the three years; they even represented less than one-third of villagers who went to town only in nonfarming seasons. Moreover, they were demographically distinct: they were noticeably older than average, and in this group males predominated to a greater extent than among other groups of movers. They were also more likely than other movers to move to Bangkok rather than to towns in Northeastern Thailand. Lastly, the group included a large proportion of heads of relatively young nuclear households, those identified earlier as having few adult workers in their households to help with farming or earning off-farm incomes. Their seasonal pattern of movement demonstrates a necessarily more responsible attitude toward their village-based households than that required of younger, single people.

The largest category of movers, 57 percent, had been away during two or more consecutive seasons, on at least one occasion. This pattern implies an absence during at least one farming season. For some, their extended stays in town were punctuated by at least one complete season in the home village. Their returns most often coincided with a farming season, contributing to the appearance of seasonality in the aggregate patterns of movement discussed earlier. But since these people were absent during at least one farming season, it would be misleading to describe them as seasonal movers.

Fifty-seven persons (13 percent of the total) had been in town for all or part of each of the 12 seasons under consideration. In the context of movement from the Roi-et area, they were relatively long-term movers who may have become "permanent" migrants. Nevertheless, only half of this group (28 of the 57) stayed away for a complete year, without returning to their home villages. The small size of this group as a proportion of all movers underlines the importance of circulation in relation to total mobility in this area of Thailand.

EXPERIENCES IN TOWN

The foregoing analysis illustrates the variety of movers' backgrounds, the strength of their ties within the village, and their intentions. It suggests caution against generalizing about their experiences in town. Why should a 40-year-old household head moving to Bangkok after a miserable harvest for the tenth or fifteenth time experience the city in the same way as his daughter or economically less desperate neighbor who is moving for the first time, or as the son of the rice-mill owner who hopes to become a doctor? Tirasawat (1978) concluded that there is

no single process of migrant adjustment in Bangkok; the nature of the adjustment process varies with characteristics of both the movers and the specific features of the movers' situation at the place of destination.

Nevertheless when one looks at the experiences of movers from the Northeast, a culturally distinctive region, some common patterns emerge. Responses to several questions illustrate the ways in which fundamental differences between the economically marginal, peasant culture of the Northeast and the highly individualistic, contract-based urban culture impinge on the individual mover.

Northeasterners who were interviewed in Bangkok, and who had gone there from various provinces (Table 3) were asked the main advantages and disadvantages of living in the city. Results are summarized in Table 11. What might broadly be termed "economic" considerations are important among both advantages and disadvantages. Fifty-one percent of respondents said that better income, "prosperity," or availability of work was the main advantage of city life; and by far the most commonly stated disadvantage was the high cost of living. Many responses, however, reflected interest in an improved quality of life, or self-development, of which income is only one component. Seventeen percent of respondents referred to "urban facilities," and a further 6 percent mentioned "entertainment," contrasting city life with the relatively dull routine of village life. The opportunity to acquire "experience and knowledge" was the main advantage cited by 13 percent of the movers.

Not all movers were fully satisfied with city life. To a greater extent than in the case of advantages, the pattern of perceived disadvantages indicates a concern with much more than overtly "economic" considerations. Worry about the "high cost of living" reflects not only a problem of finding enough cash, but also a deeper fear of dependence on an uncaring social environment where many relationships are defined in monetary terms, in contrast to life in the village where necessities can be obtained without a monetary transaction. The physical environment of the city was the main disadvantage for 14 percent of the respondents. They regarded the city as crowded, polluted, unhealthful, and physically unsafe.

As noted earlier, Northeastern Thai culture is characterized by group consciousness, or *phuuk siaw,* the placing of a high value on friendship. This sense of *phuuk siaw* tends to be reinforced by the

TABLE 11 Northeasterners in Bangkok: advantages and disadvantages of going to the city

Advantage/disadvantage	Number	Percentage
Advantages		
Better income	318	40.4
Urban facilities	131	16.6
Experience and knowledge	101	12.8
Prosperity and opportunities for the future	44	5.6
Availability of work	39	4.9
Education	14	1.8
Entertainment	46	5.8
Other	4	0.5
Don't know, not stated	2	0.3
None	89	11.3
Total	788	100.0
Disadvantages		
Living costs	283	35.9
Environment	112	14.2
Characteristics and behavior of urban people	44	5.6
Hard work, regulation and discipline	37	4.7
Safety (crimes)	28	3.6
Missing home or family	19	2.4
Housing	16	2.0
Difficulty in finding job	8	1.0
Other	7	0.9
Don't know, not stated	6	0.8
None	228	28.9
Total	788	100.0

SOURCE: Survey of Northeasterners in Bangkok.

contempt that Bangkokians often show toward Northeasterners. The corollary is that the Northeasterners see Bangkok people as unfriendly, cunning, unreliable, deceptive, and selfish. Six percent of our respondents said that the characteristics and behavior of urban people was the main disadvantage of living in town, but similar feelings are probably shared by most recent movers from the Northeast.

Dislike of conditions of work also reflects deep-seated differences in lifestyle between the city and rural Northeastern Thailand. Farming and household chores involve hard work, but not the mindless and

highly disciplined drudgery of certain kinds of work in towns. Some movers can avoid this problem by taking jobs as taxi drivers, in which they are relatively free to chart their daily patterns of work; hence the popularity of these jobs among migrants to many Southeast Asian cities. Conditions of work constituted the main disadvantage of urban life for 5 percent of the respondents, though many more expressed dislike of their working conditions.

It is worth noting that 29 percent of respondents said there was no disadvantage in living in town; and many of the remaining 71 percent undoubtedly felt that the advantages far outweighed the disadvantages. On balance, then, most movers saw moving to town as a positive rather than a negative step. But there were exceptions. For some, the problems of finding a job or the experience of being robbed or working in unacceptable, slave-like conditions made life a misery. Fully 11 percent of the movers, presumably those who had had no real choice about going to town, perceived no advantage at all in living in Bangkok.

Most of the Northeasterners interviewed in Bangkok had been successful in securing jobs with better incomes than they could earn in their home villages. There were exceptions, of course. Life is particularly difficult in the city for those without well-established contacts there. Estimating the rate of success on the basis of an urban-based study is difficult because the unsuccessful movers tend to return home; but in the case of the Roi-et study villages, where people had effective networks with the city, few movers failed to find jobs.

The economic situation among Northeasterners in Bangkok is summarized in Table 12, which shows mean monthly incomes and amounts of cash sent to the village, by demographic group. Incomes were higher among older migrants, although this finding is partly a function of the decreasing proportion of females in successively higher age groups. Women earned less cash than men and received a higher proportion of their income in the form of free accommodation and food. This difference largely explains the low incomes and low rent payments among the youngest respondents, where the proportion of females was highest.

Remittances sent home are an important link between movers and their villages of origin. Parents of younger movers may provide funds to meet the initial costs of going to town, and they may approve of the move only if their son or daughter agrees to send them money. There is thus a reciprocal relationship between many parents and their

TABLE 12 Income of and remittances from Northeasterners in Bangkok, by age and sex

Age and sex	Income per month (US $[a])	Remittances per month US $[a])	Remittances as percentage of income
Age group			
10–19	40	22	54
20–29	85	29	35
30–39	104	36	35
40+	129	57	44
Sex			
Male	99	38	39
Female	57	21	37
Mean	82	30	37

a $1 (U.S.) = 20.4 *baht.*

SOURCE: Survey of Northeasterners in Bangkok.

children in the rural-to-urban movement process. If the mover is a household head whose family is still in the village, he will remit cash in order to meet his basic responsibilities. Among those we interviewed in Bangkok, 61 percent of household heads whose families were still in Roi-et said they sent or took cash home more or less regularly. The mean amount sent was $30 (614 *baht*) per month; it represented 48 percent of the mean household income of rural Northeastern Thailand, as measured in the National Statistical Office's most recent regional socioeconomic survey (NSO, 1978b).

An interesting feature of the figures shown in Table 12 is the difference in the proportion of income sent home by younger and older movers. The youngest movers sent a much higher proportion of their cash income than the others. One reason may have been their relatively high incomes in kind; another was probably a greater sense of obligation to the households that supported their moves. This sense of obligation apparently had diminished among movers in the 20–39 age group but was stronger among the oldest category of movers, many of whom were the heads of village-based households. This finding is consistent with the greater tendency of older movers to return for the key farming seasons. The difference between the sexes in the proportion of income sent home was insignificant, despite the greater earning power of males.

CONCLUSION

Society in the Atsamat study villages retains many of its peasant characteristics, with traditional social formations, production methods, and attitudes still easily identifiable. But it is a peasant society increasingly oriented toward the modern, urban, capitalist world of Bangkok, partly because of the monetization of the local economy, but more importantly because of the process of circular movement. More and more households and individuals see wage labor in the city as the only realistic strategy for improving their living standards. The rate of movement is high, has increased, and is likely to increase further as new peer-group and patron-client networks are established between rural and urban areas, adding widespread availability of urban opportunities to existing pressures for out-movement.

The principal finding of this paper is that rural-urban movement is a highly complex process, in two important respects.

First, movement results from a wide variety of pressures on individual villagers, due to their involvement in various social and economic networks that entail irreconcilable sets of obligations and opportunities. Moving decisions take account of household resources and composition, needs and aspiration levels, and interpersonal relationships in a variety of networks, with the result that movement cannot be explained at the microlevel by any single variable or class of variables. There is no support, for example, for the proposition that individual villagers move because they are poor. It would be more accurate to say that the people who move are those who learn of particular opportunities elsewhere and have the resources to meet the costs of moving. They are not necessarily poor people, and many movers are well-off in relation to their local communities.

Second, rural-urban resource transfers associated with movement are also highly complex. Movement results in a loss of labor, though how serious the loss is depends on the timing and duration of the move; and the amount of loss in turn depends on the mover's sense of obligation to the village and other networks of which he is part. To compensate for the loss of their labor, most movers send or bring cash to the village. Whether the cash is adequate compensation depends to a great extent on how the loss of labor is calculated. If labor-exchange practices within the village break down, all households lose the advantages of being able to call on groups of workers for particular labor

needs, including the households that are neither involved in movement nor benefiting from cash remittances. There is also the long-term effect of lost labor that could have been used to improve the productive capacity of the village economy. Our study found no evidence that remittances were used for investment purposes that might have had the same effect. Therefore, the question arises whether movement results in short-term gains in consumption levels for individuals and their households, at the expense of the longer-term productive potential of the local economy.

Many empirical questions remain to be answered, but this paper suggests two conclusions. First, in Atsamat and other localities of rural Thailand rural-to-urban movement occurs on a sufficiently large scale that its real and potential effects, whether good or bad, should be taken into account in planning local development. Second, the complexities of the process are such that one should beware of any general conclusions about it and of any "blanket" policies designed to affect any part of it.

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A4500-1.27

Development perspectives and population change

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Paper 85 • April 1983

PAPERS OF THE EAST-WEST POPULATION INSTITUTE

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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Simmons, Ozzie G.
Development perspectives and population change.

(Papers of the East-West Population Institute, ISSN 0732-0531 ; paper 85 (Apr. 1983))
Revision of a paper originally commissioned to provide the background and context for the institute's Conference on Population, Resources, and Development held Sept. 13–17, 1982, in Honolulu.
Bibliography: p.
1. Underdeveloped areas–Population. 2. Economic development. I. East-West Population Institute. II. Title. III. Series: Papers of the East-West Population Institute ; no. 85.
HB884.S55 1983 304.6'2'091724 83-8886

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PREFACE

This paper was originally commissioned by the East-West Population Institute to provide the background and context for the Institute's Conference on Population, Resources, and Development. The conference was held September 13–17, 1982, in Honolulu, and brought together policy-makers, parliamentarians, and scholars from East and Southeast Asia and the United States to discuss a range of policy issues concerning relationships between population and development. The present version has been revised for publication. I am grateful to my colleague John J. Macisco, Jr., for valuable advice during preparation of the paper.

ABSTRACT Scholars in the fields of population and development largely went their separate ways until relatively recently. Systematic consideration of development processes and issues in the developing countries began essentially after World War II, and concern with population growth did not engage worldwide attention until the 1960s. The shift to an explicit focus on the issues raised by the *interaction* of population and development had its inception in the mid-1970s. In a matter of a few decades, the fields of population and of development have generated a huge volume of literature, both scientific and nonscientific. This paper presents a selective overview of some of the principal issues.

The paper considers the major perspectives that have informed the development debate, the links between current development perspectives and population change, some of the determinants and consequences of population growth, and the need for incorporating population factors into national economic and social development planning. Development policies that seek to reduce poverty and population policies aimed at reducing fertility go hand in hand. Effective implementation of policies that address both sets of problems will require major social and economic structural change.

SYSTEMATIC consideration of development processes and issues in the developing world began essentially after World War II, although some of the ideas central to development thinking have been around for a long time. Concern with population growth is also largely a post-World War II phenomenon (with the earlier exception of the Malthus controversies), but it did not engage worldwide attention until the mid-1960s. Attention to population *and* development emerged in the 1970s and coalesced as a focus at the Bucharest World Population Conference in 1974. Despite the relative brevity of these time periods, an unprecedented volume of literature and discussion has been generated in these fields, both scientific and nonscientific. This paper makes no pretense at a review of this literature, but presents a selective overview of some of the principal issues.

The paper first considers the major perspectives that have informed the development debate and then moves on to links between current development perspectives and population, to identification of some of the interrelations between population and development, to population and development planning, and finally to views on implementation. Given the limitations of space, the discussion is necessarily character-

ized by considerable oversimplification and distillation of what are often complex and controversial issues.

THE GREAT DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE

Definitions of "development," as it refers to processes of change in developing countries (LDCs), are many and diverse. Economic definitions have focused on increased production or consumption and more recently have embraced distribution of goods and services. But any brief (or unidisciplinary) formulation is likely to be of dubious value. This is because development is essentially a multidimensional process involving important changes in a society's economic, political, and social sectors, as well as in cultural beliefs and practices. And if definitions are not to be hopelessly parochial or ethnocentric, which unfortunately has too often been the case, they must consistently address the questions of development by whom, for whom, for what, and how it is to be achieved.

Development economics, which constituted the starting point for contemporary thinking about development, is a relatively new branch of economics that emerged largely after World War II (Streeten, 1979: 21). When the large-scale effort at development began in the 1950s, Western economists, and those they trained from the Third World, had virtually no experience in national development planning. They did have at hand, however, the experience of the rapid post-war reconstruction of the economies of the industrial countries of Western Europe, supported by Marshall Plan aid. Neoclassical models, which they regarded as responsible for this success, were considered just as appropriate for investment planning to generate growth of national income in the LDCs. In retrospect, it has been lamented that the problem of economic development was taken up in the wake of the successful post-war reconstruction in Western Europe, which led to unfounded optimism about what could be done in the LDCs. This was probably, however, a fruitful error because if the developed countries (DCs) had really been aware of the scope and complexity of the problem they might never have taken it up at all (Hirschman et al., 1979).

Although there were some prominent dissenters early on, the mainstream economic development thinking in the 1950s and early 1960s was dominated by a relatively simple paradigm: If the poor countries were to solve their social and economic problems, they needed "development," such as had been undergone in the West, which could be

measured by per capita income growth. Such growth could be accelerated with the help of trade and aid and investment of private capital from the DCs. Distribution was not an issue, since it was assumed that income could be distributed later, and indeed that this would happen automatically through a "trickle-down" effect. Inequality was regrettable but necessary to generate savings and provide incentives.[1]

The GNP per capita of the LDCs grew at an average rate of 3.4 percent a year during 1950–75 (Morawetz, 1977:12). This was faster than either the LDCs or the DCs had grown in any comparable period before 1950 and exceeded all expectations. To be sure, this average growth rate concealed wide differences in performance, since per capita income in some countries grew at an average annual rate of 4.2 percent while in the large poor countries of South Asia and in many in Africa, with a total of 1.1 billion people, it grew by less than 2 percent a year. After 25 years, however, even some of the countries with the highest economic growth rates did not achieve development in the sense of widespread and significant improvements in the wellbeing of the poor majorities of their populations (Higgins, 1977:99–100). On the contrary, unemployment grew, inflation accelerated, the number of malnourished and undernourished people increased, there were more children out of school than in school, health services reached only a minority of the people, and inequality of income distribution was as pervasive as ever. Given this dismal picture, the prevailing development paradigm came under increasing attack, and the "oil crisis" of the early 1970s really shook its credibility (Seers, 1979:27).

What went wrong? Among other factors, the goals of development were identified narrowly with growth in GNP to the exclusion of other critical goals; central government planning from the top down domi-

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1 Streeten (1979) contends that the early discussions of development by economists were characterized by the proliferation of ideas, criticisms, and qualifications, which contrasts sharply with the monolithic view that a single paradigm existed. This view, he says (Ibid.:25), "is an optical illusion created by looking back from later vantage points." Be that as it may, Streeten himself states later in the same paper that the Rostow model of stages of economic growth, which was a relatively pure embodiment of the neoclassical growth paradigm, was "mainstream," the influence of those who criticized the paradigm was "peripheral," and "it remains true that, though not in academic circles, the Rostow model had a powerful grip on the imagination of policy makers, planners and aid officials" (Ibid.:27–28). For other views on development theory, see Brookfield (1975), Lehmann (1979), Ohlin (1979), Papanek (1968), Ranis (1977), and Uphoff and Ilchman (1972).

nated development thinking and policy-making, and the need for participation, decentralization, and mobilization of local communities was not recognized; the rate of population growth and the problems generated by it were underestimated; the role of the DCs was seen only as involving capital aid and technical assistance, and the total impact on the LDCs of the economic policies pursued by the industrial nations was not taken into account; urban bias prevailed at the expense of the rural sector; intermediate and advanced technologies were introduced that treated labor as a scarce factor in generally labor-surplus economies; and the Third World was considered, rather monolithically, as an area with common problems, whereas some of the differences within the LDCs were at least as great as those between them and the DCs (Streeten, 1979:46–48). The list could be extended.

The earlier major models of development are those of "modernization" and of "underdevelopment," or "dependency." In the euphoria and optimism that characterized the immediate post-World War II period, confidence in the inevitability of progress had a critical influence on views about how development of the Third World ought to proceed. Thus the concept of modernization came to the fore as the model to which development efforts should be oriented (Bernstein, 1979:80–83). The modernization model constitutes a mirror image of Western society, in which the virtues of sustained economic growth, democracy, efficiency, and "rationality" are to be emulated by the LDCs in a series of progressive stages if they want to become "developed." The model was extensively criticized for its ethnocentric, deterministic, and linear characteristics, and indeed for its blithe overlooking of the empirical reality of what was going on in the LDCs, but it held center stage for a time and is still entrenched in some circles because it is a comforting and essentially simplistic notion about how to get from here to there in a world of otherwise confusing uncertainty.

The modernization model has further doleful consequences because it carries with it the assumption that tradition is an opposing force, the obstacle that modernization must overcome if it is to arrive at its destination (Hutton and Cohen, 1975). This is essentially an ahistorical view of traditional society (primarily peasant society) as an unchanging equilibrium and it obscures, among other things, the fact that many prominent characteristics of so-called traditional societies emerged during the 19th century as a result of the widespread social, political, and economic changes following colonialism. Just as the

modernization view leads away from systematic empirical observation, so the view of traditionalism leads to the glossing over of first-hand observation of the variety of actual situations in which different peasant groups find themselves, in order to understand why they behave as they do.

Beginning in the late 1960s, and partly in response to the growing disenchantment with the modern-traditional dichotomy, another view became popular in which the international system of rich country-poor country relationships creates and maintains the underdevelopment of the poor countries. Whether deliberately exploitative or unintentionally neglectful, the coexistence of rich countries (the "center") and poor countries (the "periphery") renders the efforts of the poor countries to choose their own style of development more difficult, if not impossible (Streeten, 1979:27). In the less developed countries, the groups who have wealth, high social status, and political power constitute ruling elites who perpetuate the international system of inequality and LDC dependence.

The most voluminous and sophisticated body of thought about underdevelopment and dependency has emerged in Latin America.[2] Space prohibits any elaboration of this thought here, but it may be noted that it has both reformist and revolutionary strands. The actual mechanisms of dependency are seldom spelled out in detail (O'Brien, 1975:23–25). It is never clear which specific policies are to be followed with regard to technical transfer and technical development, unemployment, income distribution, and so on. The main policy advocated is that of changing the internal structure to achieve national development. Whatever may be the limitations of the dependency view, however, it has made a basic point of substantial importance, namely, that the interplay between the internal LDC structures and international structures is the critical starting point for an understanding of the process of development.

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2 For a view of underdevelopment from the communist countries, see the work of Tamas Szentes (1977, 1980), a Hungarian economist. Griffin (1969) has done an extensive study of underdevelopment in Latin America. Kahl (1976) has published a detailed review of the work of three of the leading Latin American sociologists who have worked on underdevelopment (or dependency) –Germani, Gonzalez Casanova, and Cardoso. Frank (1969, 1980) is the best-known (because his work has been available in English) proponent of the underdevelopment perspective. Brookfield (1975) writes lucidly about the Latin American work, as he does about most other aspects of development.

Like modernization, underdevelopment is perceived as a unitary process with uniform causes and uniform effects. Again like modernization, the underdevelopment or dependency perspective employs a unilinear determinism to arrive at the desirable end state. Just as tradition is the obstacle to be overcome if modernization is to triumph, so the penetration of international capitalism constitutes the obstacle to be removed if indigenous economic and social development is to occur in the countries of the Third World (Bernstein, 1979:91–94).

The limitations of both the modernization and the dependency models have given new impetus to a search for development perspectives that are not so closely tied to competing ideologies and bound by dichotomous thinking, perspectives that can embrace a variety of development alternatives for the LDCs. The most prominent shift in development objectives during the past three decades has come about through the perception that the exclusive pursuit of economic growth was too narrow an objective and that other objectives, related to poverty reduction–improving income distribution, increasing employment, and satisfying "basic needs"–must be taken into account (Morawetz, 1977:7). What has been discovered (or in fact rediscovered, since these issues have been around for some time) is that production objectives cannot be separated from those of distribution.

In the early 1970s, staff of the World Bank and of the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex undertook a study of the relationships between economic growth and distribution. The study resulted in a report, which received wide attention, concluding that distributional objectives should be treated as an integral part of development and growth strategy and advocating "redistribution with growth" (Chenery et al., 1974). One major component of this approach would be to focus on a range of direct measures, such as land reform, the distribution of education and other public services, and measures to redistribute assets toward the poverty groups, adapting the approach to the different characteristics of rural and urban poverty groups. Several critics have argued, however, that a policy of redistribution *with* economic growth has little validity since, on the one hand, it may not be possible to grow first and redistribute later because the structure of growth already established in an economy largely fixes the pattern of distribution so that those who already own assets are in the best position to profit once growth begins, and, on the other hand, marginal redistribution (i.e., the distribution of a part

of the additional income generated by economic growth) is insufficient to solve the problem of widespread unemployment and mass poverty. Consequently, these critics conclude that it is necessary to redistribute first and improve productivity later (Morawetz, 1977:41; Weeks, 1975:101; Adelman, 1979:161, 165).

The emergence of "basic needs" in the mid-1970s as an approach explicitly directed at meeting the needs of the poor in expanded and accelerated programs can be seen as a natural consequence in the continuing search for more effective development strategies. The essential formulation of the basic-needs perspective was contained in a report prepared by the International Labour Office (ILO) for the participants in the ILO World Employment Conference in 1976 (International Labour Office, 1977). In the few years that have elapsed since then, a huge literature on basic needs has appeared, and the basic-needs approach has come to occupy a prominent place on the agenda of international meetings (Garcia-Bouza, 1980).

In the ILO formulation, basic needs include two elements: (1) certain minimum requirements of a family for private consumption—adequate food, clothing, and shelter; and (2) essential services provided by and for the community at large, such as safe drinking water, sanitation, public transport, and health and educational facilities. Brief reference is made to placing this approach within the broader context of nonmaterial needs—human freedom, physical security, and other factors that contribute to a person's sense of identity, achievement, and satisfaction. There are many lists of basic needs in the literature, but the precise scope, content, and priorities must be left for definition to the countries and groups that adopt a basic-needs approach (Cassen, 1978a). Clearly, it would be more than presumptuous to think that this task can be accomplished by the staffs of international agencies.

Whatever may be the definition of basic needs, a large portion of the populations of the LDCs falls below any acceptable levels. Consider the estimates in a 1980 World Bank report (International Bank, 1980:33–34): The number of people in absolute poverty in the LDCs (excluding China and other centrally planned economies) is estimated at around 780 million. In 1975, about 600 million adults in the LDCs were illiterate; only two-fifths of the children currently complete more than three years of primary school. In 1978, 550 million people lived in countries where the average life expectancy was less than 50 years, and 400 million in countries where the average death rate of children

one to four years old was more than 20 per 1,000. The most widely accepted estimate of the number of malnourished people is about 460 million; malnutrition appears to contribute to between one-third and two-thirds of all child deaths, and perhaps even more in the poorest countries (Murdoch, 1980:2).

Increased employment and income for the poor are central to the basic-needs perspective. Despite the substantial industrial progress achieved in the LDCs, it would have had to be much greater to absorb even the rapidly growing urban labor force, let alone the labor force in agriculture, which in many LDCs constitutes around 75 percent of the total labor force (Sewell et al., 1980:82–83).

Criticism of the basic-needs approach has appeared from many quarters, not least from LDC officials, to the effect that vigorous pursuit of this approach will impair the rate of economic growth, i.e., that basic needs can be met only at the expense of growth (Garcia-Bouza, 1980:45–46; Dell, 1978). For most of the principal advocates of the basic-needs approach, rapid rates of economic growth continue to be regarded as essential, but it is true that for some the preferred locus for such growth appears to have shifted from industrialization to rural development. It is likely that this shift accounts for the fears of LDC officials that pursuit of the basic-needs approach may be at the expense of economic growth, which to a large extent they still equate with industrial development (Singh, 1979:586). The choice is not between industry and agriculture (although much greater emphasis on employment-oriented rural development is needed), however, but between different types of goals for development. It has been observed that the test of a successful strategy of industrialization is the extent to which it reduces the gap between the high incomes in the high-productivity, high-technology sector and the low incomes in the low-productivity, low-technology sector by raising the performance of the latter without impeding progress in the former (Streeten, 1975). The satisfaction of basic needs depends not only on the provision of government services but also critically on the generation of productive employment and greater income for the poor so that they can pay their share. Moreover, the basic-needs approach calls for a search for low-cost solutions to problems of food, health, education, and shelter through reallocation of current patterns of expenditure in these areas in favor of the poor, and for mobilization of community action to contribute to the financing of public services. To meet the basic needs